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INTRODUCTION
The American flag is a rectangular piece of cloth with the colors red,
white and blue arranged in stars and stripes. Standing alone, like markings
on a piece of paper, the flag lacks meaning. Possible meanings emerge only
when this piece of cloth is seen and interpreted, just as the meanings of
markings on a piece of paper arise only when they are apprehended as
words of a language. Like the interpretation of such words,' the meanings
attributed to the American flag depend on what the viewer brings to the
activity of viewing. The piece of cloth can yield aesthetic meanings by virtue
of its shape, color and design. Indeed, numerous artists have made aesthetic
use of the American flag.2 Similarly, viewers are likely to perceive cognitive
and emotional meanings from the cloth and its symbolic configurations.
These observations draw from semiotic theory and structuralist studies of
language.' In semiotic terms, the American flag is a signifier and the various
aesthetic, intellectual and emotional meanings that may be attached to it
are signifieds. What is signified by the American flag has no natural or
necessary relationship to that signifier; rather, what is signified by the
American flag is solely a function of socially created conventions.4 Just as
words have no meaning apart from the conventions of the language in
which they appear, and apart from their relation to other words in that
language,' the American flag similarly has no meanings apart from those
conventionally given to it by those who see it.
In the case of the American flag, many conventionally agreed upon
meanings have not only intellectual content but emotive content as well.
Many Americans feel strongly about the flag, seeing within its borders a
patriotic symbol of both the nationhood and the ideals of the United States.
1. See, e.g., S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN TMiS CLASS? (1980).
2. See the amicus curiae brief filed on January 25, 1989, by sixteen famous artists (Jasper
Johns, Robert Rauschenberg and Claes Oldenburg among them) in support of the defendant
in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
3. See Sturrock, Introduction, in STRUCTURAMISM AND SINCE: FROM LAvI-STRAUss TO
DMUUDA (J. Sturrock ed. 1979) [hereinafter STRUCTURAIUSM].
[A] true ('serious') structuralist is to be recognized by the use he makes of a
number of technical terms, taken over, as it happens, from structural linguistics.
One of these terms is sign, which is central to the 'lexicon of signification.'
This lexicon derives from the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de
Saussure (1857-1913), whose theoretical work on natural or human language in
the early years of the present century lies behind all of modern structuralism.
[This includes his] insights into the basic unit of any language, the linguistic
sign. [A]ny word in a language is a sign, and language functions as a
system of signs.
Id. at 5-6.
4. Id. at 8-9.
5. Id., see infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text (containing further discussion of
signifier and signified in the context of the Johnson decision).
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Indeed, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, many approach the American
flag 'with an almost mystical reverence regardless of what sort of social,
political, or philosophical beliefs they may have." 6
In this Article, I explore the deeply theoretical implications of the Supreme
Court's controversial 1989 decision in Texas v. Johnson.7 The Johnson
Court held, 5-4, that the Constitution prohibited Texas from punishing a
person who burned an American flag as a means of political protest under
a criminal statute which in part defined the criminal conduct in terms of
its offense to the viewers of the conduct.8 In Part I, after commenting
briefly on earlier flag-related Supreme Court case law as well as the Court's
1990 decision in United States v. Eichman,9 I evaluate Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court in Johnson. I conclude that Justice Brennan's opinion
is a significant first amendment opinion renumscent of Justice Harlan's
landmark opinion in Cohen v California.'0
In Part II, I analyze the unusual substance and rhetoric of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Johnson." Taking seriously the dissent's
aversion to desecration, I examine what it means to sacralize an object,
focusing on the connection between the symbolic and the sacred. Assisted
by the insights of theologian Mircea Eliade regarding the sacred,h'I suggest
that the dissenters improperly conflated signifier and signified to derive an
understanding of the American flag as in fact sacred. I then argue that it
is this move which accounts for the dissent's insistence that the desecration
of the flag should not be protected by the first amendment. 3
In Part III, I consider the implications of understanding the American
flag as sacred. I first explore the possible outcome of Johnson had the
Court approached it as an establishment of religion case. I then discuss the
similarities between the Court's current establishment of religion approach
6. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
7. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, while Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Wute and O'Connor joined in dissent. Id. at 2548. Justice Stevens
filed a separate dissent. Id. at 2555.
8. Id. at 2548.
9. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
10. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). I will premise this conclusion on the rhetoric used, the straight-
forward first amendment approach taken, and the arguments of the dissent that Justice
Brennan's opinion fails to address. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
II. 109 S. Ct. at 2548.
12. See infra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
13. As I will argue, treating the flag as sacred amounts to exempting it, and therefore flag
burning, from the first amendment-world altogether.
Helpful law review articles dealing with flag burning and symbolic speech include Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. Ray. 1482 (1975); Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under
the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. R-v. 29 (1973); and Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 1091 (1968).
1991]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to displays of a creche scene14 and the dissent's approach in Johnson. In
Part IV, I analyze the implications of treating Johnson as a civil religion
case and inquire what loss may inure to our sense of political community
as a result of the Court's decision.
That many consider the flag a sacred patriotic symbol exemplifies what
Nietzsche described as a society's aesthetic impulse to create myths.' 5 To
the extent that the cohesiveness of the American political commumty depends
on the existence of myth, any diminution of the flag as a sacred patriotic
symbol may adversely affect an individual's sense of connection to the
political commumty. Correspondingly, an individual may become less willing
to participate in self-government. In light of these concerns, one could make
a strong argument that Johnson unduly promoted individual liberty at the
expense of political community
Nevertheless, I suggest in Part V that, all in all, Johnson's lessons
outweigh its potential disadvantages. Even apart from its articulation of
traditional first amendment principles, Johnson's lessons include: a deep
understanding of what the American flag as patriotic symbol represents;
the triumph of reason and, therefore, of the Enlightenment; and, finally,
important insights about symbols, their manufacture and manipulation by
those in positions of power, and the difference between symbols and truth.
Thus, I defend Johnson fbr its educational functions even though I find
patriotic symbols important to the sense of political community in the
United States.
I. THE FLAG AND FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
A. The Constitutional Background of Flag Desecration
Texas v Johnson 6 was by no means the first Supreme Court decision
concermng the American flag in a first amendment setting. As early as
1943, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette," the Court
ruled that public schools could not force students to salute and pledge
allegiance to the flag. Justice Jackson, in a justly famous quote, declared:
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
14. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (a city's display of a creche was not
violative of the establishment of religion clause); see infra text accompanying notes 135-42.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 153-61; see also Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse:
The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEo. L.J. 1719 (1989) (discussing Nietzschean theories
of language and rhetoric).
16. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
17 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940). An earlier case upholding a state statute prohibiting the commercial use of the Amencan
flag, Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), did not implicate the first amendment because
it had not yet been held applicable to the states. See infra text accompanying notes 122-24
where Halter's reasoning is addressed.
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nationalism, religion, or other matters of opimon or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein." 8
While Barnette dealt with compelled symbolic speech, Street v New
York19 involved the application of a crirmnal statute to a defendant who
protested the shooting of a civil rights leader by burning an American flag
while exclaiming: 'We don't need no damn flag.... If they let that
happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag." '20 Instead, the Court
held that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Street "because it
permitted him to be punished merely for speaking defiant or contemptuous
words about the American flag." '2 1 Because the statute prohibited both
public exhibits of "contempt by words or acts" toward the American flag
and its public mutilation, defilement or defacement, the Court managed to
sidestep the issue in Johnson that centered on the mere act of flag burmng
independent of oral expression.
In 1974, the Court again avoided the Johnson issue in Smith v. Goguen."
Goguen involved a defendant who wore a small cloth replica of the American
flag sewn to the seat of his pants. After wearing the patch in public,
Goguen was convicted of violating a statute which made it a crime to
publicly mutilate, trample upon, deface or treat contemptuously the Amer-
ican flag. The Court emphasized that the defendant was not prosecuted for
physical desecration and determined that the statute, insofar as it referred
to "publicly [treating] contemptuously the flag of the United States," was
void for vagueness. 23
In the same year the Court once again avoided the issue in Spence v
Washington.2 4 In Spence the defendant was convicted under a flag misuse
statute that prohibited the exhibition of any American flag to which was
attached or superimposed 'any . . word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing or advertisement.' 2 In protest of the United States invasion of
Cambodia and the Kent State killings, the defendant had draped an Amer-
ican flag outside the window of his apartment. Affixed to the flag was
18. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. Justice Frankfurter dissented m a lengthy opinion. Justice
Frankfurter's opening has become equally famous:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted mnority in history is not
likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my
purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate myself with
the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing as they do the
thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile,
neither Catholic nor agnostic.
Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
20. Id. at 579 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
22. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
23. Id. at 582.
24. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curai).
25. Id. at 407 (footnote omitted) (quoting WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.86.010 (1974)).
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removable tape in the shape of a peace sign. The Court described the act
as the "expression [of an idea] in the context of activity" 26 and held that
the statute was unconstitutionally applied to the defendant. It reasoned:
"There was no risk that [defendant's] acts would mislead viewers into
assuming that the Government endorsed his viewpoint. [Also, he] did
[not] permanently disfigure the flag or destroy it. [H]is message was
direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours of the First Amend-
ment." 27
In each of the latter three cases-Street, Smith and Spence-at least three
Justices dissented, foreshadowing the 5-4 split in Johnson. In Street, four
Justices criticized the majority for avoiding what they thought was the
pivotal question: 'whether the deliberate act of burmng an American flag
in public as a "protest" may be pumshed as a crime."' In Smith, as in
Spence, three Justices argued for the constitutionality of criminal statutes
if "designed to preserve the physical integrity of the flag, and not merely
to pumsh those who would infringe that integrity for the purpose of
disparaging the flag as a symbol." 29 However, it was only in Johnson,
decided in 1989, that the Court first squarely faced the question of the
constitutionality of a state's flag desecration statute as applied to flag
burning in political protest. 30 One year later, in United States v
26. Id. at 414 n.8.
27. Id. at 414-15. Spence was relied upon in United States ex rel. Radich v. Cnminal
Court, 385 F Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y 1974), which involved an art gallery's display of sculpture-
like "constructions" created by an artist. Three of the forms were "an object resembling a
gun caisson wrapped in a flag, a flag stuffed into the shape of a six-foot human form hanging
by the neck from a yellow noose, and a seven-foot 'cross with a bishop's mitre on the head-
piece, the arms wrapped in ecclesiastical flags and an erect penis wrapped in an Amencan flag
protruding from the vertical standard."' Id. at 168 (citation omitted) (quoting People v.
Radich, 53 Misc. 2d at 718, 279 N.Y.S. 2d at 682). Reasoning from Spence, the court ruled
that the proprietor's conviction for violating a New York statute which prohibited casting
contempt on the Amencan flag violated the first amendment. The court determined that the
forms were intended to convey a political message and that such a message was understood
by viewers. The court also noted that, while it dealt with the issue before it as symbolic
speech, it just as well could have put the decision in "pure speech" terms given 'the artistic,
political and controversial significance of the sculptures."' Id. at 174 n.34 (citation omitted)
(quoting Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 100 n.18 (1972)).
28. Street, 394 U.S. at 595 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Street, 229 N.E.2d
187, 189, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 234 (1967)).
29. Smith, 415 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); accord Spence, 418 U.S. at 420-21
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. Because the Texas statute, see infra note 34, defined the criminal act in terms of
offense to others, Johnson did not address the broader question of whether Congress or the
states can impose criminal sanctions in order to protect the physical integrity of the American
flag apart from any connection to "the suppression of free expression." United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). One argument for the constitutionality of such legislation is
that, because it would purport to focus solely on the physical integrity of the flag, it would
be unrelated to the suppression of free expression and therefore would be tested by the
[Vol. 66:511
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Eichnan,31 the Court again faced this question, this time in connection with
a federal statute.
B. The Supreme Court's Johnson and Eichman Decisions
1. Texas v. Johnson32
At the 1984 Republican National Convention m Dallas, Texas, Gregory
Lee Johnson burned an American flag. While the flag was burning, he and
other protestors chanted, "'America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on
you."' 33 Johnson was subsequently arrested and convicted for violating a
Texas statute prohibiting the desecration of a venerated object.3 4 On appeal,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, ruling that the defendant's
conviction violated the first amendment. 35 After granting certiorari, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, affirmed, 5-4.36
In Is opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized that the defendant's conduct
was clearly expressive conduct to which the first amendment applied. 37 This
relatively lenient O'Brien standard.
I seriously doubt, however, whether such a statute can ever be constitutional. The flag
conventionally conveys a particular patriotic message and, thus, legislation directed against
flag mutilation is neither content-neutral nor viewpoint-free. See Nimmer, supra note 13, at
57 ("A flag desecration statute is, then, in essence a governmental command that one idea
(embodied in the flag symbol) is not to be countered by another idea (embodied in the act of
flag desecration)."); see also Ely, supra note 13, at 1507-08 (footnote omitted) ("[An improper
use statute] is, at best, analogous to a law prohibiting the interruption of patriotic speeches,
and that is a law that is hardly 'unrelated to the suppression of free expression."'). But see
Hearings Before the House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989) (testimony of Laurence H. Tribe) (arguing against a consti-
tutional amendment in response to Johnson and in favor of a federal statute protecting the
physical integrity of all American flags); Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 IowA
L. Ray. 111 (1989) (suggesting that a properly drafted statute prohibiting physical impairment
of the flag might survive a first amendment challenge).
In United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990), the Court held that such a statute,
the Federal Flag Protection Act of 1989, is unconstitutional as applied to political protest. See
infra text accompanying notes 60-76.
31. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
32. 109 S. Ct. 2533. In Tushnet, The Flag-Burning Episode: An Essay on the Constitution,
61 U. CoLo. L. REv. 39 (1990), Mark Tushnet argues that the flag-burning episode is a
"constitutional moment" (using Bruce Ackerman's term) because of the way the polity of the
United States responded to the Court's decision in Johnson.
33. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2536.
34. The Texas statute, "Desecration of Venerated Object," made criminal the intentional
or knowing desecration of "a state or national flag." "Desecrate" was defined as "deface,
damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend
one or more persons likely to observe his action." Tax. PENAL CODE AN. § 42.09 (Vernon
1989). Note the criterion of offense to others and thus the non-private nature of desecration
as defined.
35. Johnson v. Texas, 755 S.W.2d 92 (rex. Crim. App. 1988).
36. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533.
37. Id. at 2541.
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fact had been conceded by Texas. For the majority the question turned on
the proper first amendment test to be used. There was no showing that the
defendant intended to incite inmmient lawless conduct or was likely to bring
it about. Similarly, the defendant's conduct did not constitute "fighting
words." 3 Thus, under established first amendment principles, Texas did
not have an interest in preventing breaches of the peace.39
The second interest asserted by Texas-preserving the flag as a symbol
of nationhood and national unity-was a legitimate interest but one that
was related to expression. Hence, the relatively lenient first amendment
standard of United States v O'Bren,40 the draft-card burning case, was
inapplicable to the defendant's conduct. Noting that the Texas statute was
not aimed at the physical integrity of the flag but rather at "protect[ing] it
only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others," the
Court applied "the most exacting scrutiny" and held the statute unconsti-
tutional as applied to Johnson.4' Because Texas argued that the defendant
conveyed a message casting "doubt on either the idea that nationhood and
national unity are the flag's referents or that national unity actually exists," 42
the statute ran afoul of the first amendment's "bedrock principle [that
government] may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. '43
The Court also rejected the contention that governments have the power
to limit a symbol's meaning. 44 Justice Brennan then concluded: "We do
not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we
dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents. ' 45 Justice Kennedy
concurred," stressing the difficulty of concurring mn a decision so personally
distasteful to him. Still, he determined that the first amendment dictated
the Court's conclusion even though he agreed that "the flag holds a lonely
place of honor in an age when absolutes are distrusted and simple truths
are burdened by unneeded apologetics." 47
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, dis-
sented.48 He focused primarily on the "unique position" of the American
38. Id. at 2542.
39. Id. at 2541-42.
40. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
42. Id. at 2544.
43. Id.
44. In support of this point, the Court relied on Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58
(1970), which held unconstitutional a federal statute allowing actors portraying members of
one of the armed forces to 'wear the uniform of that armed force [only] if the portrayal
does not tend to discredit that armed force."' Id. at 60 (emphasis in original) (quoting 10
U.S.C. § 772(f) (1956)).
45. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
46. Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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flag "as the symbol of our Nation, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental
prohibition against flag burning in the way [the defendant] did here." '49 His
opimon recounted the history of the American flag and the flag's relation
to the founding of the United States, the extent to which it was visible in
various wars, including the Civil War, and its symbolic value in circum-
stances where many lost their lives. Noting that millions of Americans
regard the flag with "mystical reverence," Cief Justice Rehnquist quoted
portions of Emerson's "Concord Hymn" and the national anthem, as well
as Whittier's patriotic poem "Barbara Frietchie" in its entirety 50
On the first amendment merits, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that
burning the American flag was the same as uttering fighting words which
the first amendment does not protect. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, burning
the flag was "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and at the same
time it had a tendency to incite a breach of the peace."15 1 He further
characterized flag burning as the equivalent of an "inarticulate grunt or
roar''52 the sole function of which is to antagonize others. In addition, he'
suggested that Texas was not punishing the defendant's ideas but only his
use of this particular symbol.53 He concluded: "The Court decides that the
American flag is just another symbol, about which not only must opinions
pro and con be tolerated, but for which the most minimal public respect
may not be enjoined." 54
Justice Stevens also dissented, 55 arguing that first amendment "rules that
apply to a host of other symbols, such as state flags, armbands, or various
privately promoted emblems of political or commercial identity, are not
49. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to argue that
there are other equally effective and constitutionally protected ways for persons like Johnson
to express contempt for the Amencan flag and the United States. This suggestion-that the
availability of other vehicles and forums for expression is relevant to the constitutionality of
governmental attempts to regulate speech-also appears m those cases approving the regulation
of certain kinds of government property not found to be public forums. See, e.g., Members
of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 813-16 (1984) (upholding an
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property when applied to persons who
placed political campaign signs on public utility poles). The Court stated:
[A] restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of
communication are inadequate. To the extent that the posting of signs on
public property has advantages over [other] forms of expression, there is no
reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained through other
means. [N]othing indicates that the posting of political posters on public
property is a uniquely valuable [vehicle] of communication, or that appellees'
ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on
expression.
Id. at 812 (citations omitted).
54. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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necessarily controlling. [T]his case has an intangible dimension that
makes those rules inapplicable. '56 In his view, what the defendant did had
nothing to do with "disagreeable ideas" but instead constituted "disagree-
able conduct that diminishe[d] the value of an important national
asset."' 57 For Justice Stevens, Johnson's method of expression, not the
expression itself, was properly punishable by Texas. Terming the flag a
national asset, yet admitting it is intangible, Justice Stevens compared the
government's power to prohibit flag desecration with the power to prevent
someone from spraying paint on the Lincoln Memorial as a form of protest.'
In both cases, government would be preserving the quality of an important
national asset.
2. United States v Eichman: Johnson Revisited
One year after Johnson, the Court decided United States v Eichman.5 9
In Eichman, the Court held that the Federal Flag Protection Act of 198960
(the "Act"), passed in response to Johnson, could not constitutionally be
applied to punish persons burning the flag in political protest. 61 Writing
again for a bare majority, Justice Brennan determined that the Act was not
significantly different from the Texas statute invalidated in Johnson.62 He
observed that-although the Act did not purport to target expressive conduct
on the basis of message content but was, instead, arguably directed at the
56. Id. at 2556 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. Clearly, Justice Stevens chose the wrong analogy because the Lincoln Memorial is
public property while the Texas statute and others like it, including the recently enacted federal
legislation, see infra note 60, apply to privately owned flags. However, I do not suggest that
private ownership, standing alone, is dispositive of the first amendment issue. For example,
the constitutionality under the first amendment of government's aesthetic regulation of land
use is not determined solely by the private ownership of such property. See the well known
case of People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), which
rejected the first amendment argument of landowners who regularly hung clotheslines with old
clothes in their front yard as a form of protest against high taxes imposed by a city, and
upheld an ordinance that prohibited clothes lines in a front yard abutting a street.
59. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
60. This statute, which amends 18 U.S.C. § 700(a), provides in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on
the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the disposal of a
flag when it has become worn or soiled.
As used in this section, the term "flag of the United States" means any flag
of the United States, or any part thereof, made of any substance, of any size,
in a form that is commonly displayed.
18 U.S.C.A. § 700(a)(1)-(b) (West Supp. 1990).
61. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. at 2409.
62. Id.
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physical integrity of the flag-the government's asserted interest was nev-
ertheless related to the suppression of free expression and concerned with
content. 63 To the government's argument that there was "a perceived need
to preserve the flag's status as a symbol of our Nation and certain national
ideals,"6 4 Justice Brennan responded: "But the mere destruction or disfig-
urement of a particular physical manifestation of the symbol, without more,
does not diminsh or otherwise affect the symbol itself in any way. For
example, the secret destruction of a flag in one's own basement would not
threaten the flag's recognized meamng.1 6
Thus, the government's interest in protecting the flag arose only when a
person treated the flag in a way that communicated a message inconsistent
with those specified ideals. Justice Brennan supported this assessment by
commenting that the Act's reference to mutilating, defacing, defiling and
the like "unmistakably connotes disrespectful treatment of the flag and
suggests a focus on those acts likely to damage the flag's symbolic value."66
Thus, the Act had the same "fundamental flaw" as the Texas statute in
Johnson: "[I]t suppresses expression out of concern for its likely commu-
nicative impact."67 Declining to reevaluate the holding in Johnson, Justice
Brennan applied "the most exacting scrutiny" and found that the govern-
ment's interest did not justify the Act's interference with first amendment
nghts. 6 The Act was therefore unconstitutional as applied to the defendants'
political protests. Justice Brennan"concluded: "Punishing desecration of the
flag dilutes the very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth
revering."69
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
O'Connor, dissented.70 Harking back to his dissent in Johnson, Justice
Stevens declared that the government has a legitimate interest in preserving
the symbolic value of the flag because it "umquely symbolizes the ideas of
liberty, equality, and tolerance-ideas that Americans have passionately
defended and debated throughout our history. The flag embodies the spirit
of our national commitment to those ideals." 71 Justice Stevens characterized
Eichman as involving a question of judgment: "Does the admittedly im-
portant interest in allowing every speaker to choose the method of expressing
his or her ideas that he or she deems most effective and appropnate outweigh
the societal interest in preserving the symbolic value of the flag?" 72
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2408.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2409.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2410.
70. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2411 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
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Answering this question in the negative, Justice Stevens asserted that the
individual interest in expression was outweighed by the fact that tolerance
of flag burning would "tarnish" the value of the flag as a national symbol. 73
Justice Stevens maintained that, because of the actions of political leaders
and the Court in Johnson, the "symbolic value of the American flag is not
the same today as it was yesterday 74 Despite Johnson, Stevens felt con-
strained to dissent and not simply follow stare decisis because "the consid-
erations identified in my opinion in Texas v. Johnson are of controlling
importance in this case as well. ' 75
Eichman is largely a derivative decision. Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion in Eichman added relatively little to his earlier and more extensive
opimon in Johnson. Similarly, Justice Stevens' dissenting opimon added
little to his Johnson dissent. What's more, the Eichman dissent lacked the
historical and poetic flourishes found in Chief Justice Rehnquist's Johnson
dissent. For the purposes of this Article, therefore, it is Johnson that merits
attention.
C. Johnson's Majority Opinion Analyzed
1. Johnson: An Easy First Amendment Case
Despite the vigor of the dissent, Johnson posed an easy first amendment
issue for several reasons. It involved concededly expressive conduct-so
intended and understood-dealing with a political issue: national unity.
Johnson was thus readily distinguishable from United States v. O'Brien . 6
Although both are symbolic speech cases, the government's interest in
Johnson was directly related to expression, unlike the government interest
in draft registration implicated in O'Brien. In addition, Johnson was ren-
dered more straightforward because the Court dealt with the constitutionality
of the Texas statute as applied, and not its facial constitutionality. In so
doing, and by emphasizing that the Texas statute defined desecration in
terms of serious offense to persons observing the conduct, the Court avoided
the broader (and perhaps more difficult) question of whether a state can
protect the physical integrity of the flag through a statute that does not
focus on offense to others.77
73. Id. at 2412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
77 See supra note 30 (containing a brief discussion of the first amendment validity of
such a statute as applied to political protest); see also supra note 60 (where the Federal Flag
Protection Act of 1989 is set out in relevant part). If this Act had been held constitutional in
Eichman, then the use of the American flag in such art works as Scott Tyler's controversial
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Johnson posed an easy first amendment issue for another reason: the
result is consistent with mainstream first amendment theories. Under Al-
exander Meiklejohn's self-governing theory of the 'first amendment, 8 the
clear political content of the expressive conduct in Johnson is at the core
of the first amendment and thus should be protected. Similarly, under the
marketplace of ideas theory, 9 both the intellectual and emotive8 content of
the expressive conduct make a contribution to the ongoing national debate
"What is the Proper Way to Display the American Flag" would be prohibited. This work,
exhibited at the School of the Art Institute of Chicago in early 1989 by a young artist-student,
included an American flag on the floor adjacent to a wall from which a shelf protruded.
There was a photographic montage on the wall above the shelf which included photographs
of political protestors. In addition, on the shelf was a book in which viewers were asked to
record their impressions. The controversial aspects of this work included the placement of the
flag on the floor, together with the likelihood that those wishing to write their impressions
would have to step on the flag in order to do so. See Wilkerson, Veterans Protest Flag Exhibit
at Art Institute, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1989, at AI9, col. 1.
Johnson is conspicuously silent about the use of the American flag in works of art, especially
in light of the amicus curiae brief filed in the Supreme Court by famous artists, many of
whom have used the American flag for aesthetic purposes. See supra note 2. This silence is,
of course, explainable by the facts in Johnson itself, which involved the use of the American
flag for political protest. Nevertheless, the Court's silence is consistent with what I,have
elsewhere called the marginalization of artistic expresgion in first amendment jurisprudence.
See Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: The Beautiful, the Sublime and the
First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. Rav. 221.
78. According to Meildejohn:
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who must pass
judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. Just so far as, at any
point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are demed acquaintance with
information or opimon which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result
must be ill-considered . It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the
community against which the First Amendment is directed. The principle of
the freedom of speech is a deduction from the basic American agreement
that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.
A. MEmI oHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELi-GovERiENr 26-27 (1948) (emphasis
m original).
79. This theory is based in large measure on John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (1859), written
after the first amendment was ratified. In his famous marketplace of ideas dissent in Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), Justice Holmes contended that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
80. Although speaking in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), about what he termed
"linguistic expression"-the defendant there publicly wore a jacket on which was written
"Fuck the Draft"-Justice Harlan could just as well have been describing flag burning when
he asserted:
[L]inguistic expression serves a dual commumcative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpress-
ible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive
as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while
solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard
for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be commumcated.
Id. at 26.
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about what the United States represents. Finally, those espousing a self-
fulfillment theory of the first amendment"' would surely agree that the
expressive conduct in Johnson promoted Johnson's personal self-fulfillment.
2. Rhetoric, Methodology and the Cohen Case
The Court's opinion in Johnson is striking for its restrained rhetoric, its
methodology and its refusal to respond in kind to the emotional arguments
of the dissenters. All of this seems clearly intended to cool what could have
turned into a highly charged debate among the Justices about patriotism.
Consider Justice Brennan's rhetoric. His opinion is for the most part matter-
of-fact in the way it sets out generally applicable first amendment principles.
Even when he commented on the flag, Justice Brennan recogmzed that it
is singular primarily because of the concepts that it represents. His major
rhetorical flourish was his argument to the dissenters:
[P]recisely because it is our flag that is involved, one's response to the
flag-burner may exploit the umquely persuasive power of the flag itself.
We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than
waving one's own, no better way to counter a flag-burner's message
than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the
dignity even of the flag that burned than by according its remains
a respectful burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its
desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished
emblem represents.82
Likewise, the Court's first amendment methodology in Johnson was
intended to cool debate. The Court calmly marched from one aspect of
traditional first amendment analysis to another. In this respect, Johnson is
reminiscent of Justice Harlan's landmark opinion in Cohen v California.3
Like the defendant in Johnson, the defendant in Cohen had engaged in
expressive "conduct"-wearing a jacket on which was written "Fuck the
Draft"-that constituted highly emotional and offensive expression whose
cognitive message could have been commumcated otherwise. In Cohen,
Justice Harlan employed a step-by-step analysis of the traditional first
amendment categories of unprotected speech and found none applicable to
the challenged provision.8 4
81. See, e.g., M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPREssioN: A CRmTIcAL ANALYSis (1984); Richards,
Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U.
PA. L. REv 45 (1974). Redish speaks of "the instrumental value in developing individuals'
mental faculties so that they may reach their full intellectual potential," as well as "the
inherent value in allowing individuals to control their own destiny." M. REDisH, supra, at 30.
82. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
83. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
84. Id. at 18-22. For example, Justice Harlan observed that Cohen did not involve obscene
speech, fighting words, a hostile audience or a captive audience. All of this, of course, is
equally true of Johnson, notwithstanding Chief Justice Rehnquist's unfounded contention that
the defendant's conduct constituted fighting words.
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Justice Harlan ultimately concluded in Cohen that the merely offensive,
even immature, nature of the defendant's expression constitutionally could
not be punished. He maintained that distinguising the words used by the
defendant from any other offensive words was not possible because "one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric." ' 5 In addition, he observed that particular
"words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force
* which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element
of the overall message sought to be commumcated." ' 6 Finally, he contended
that baning particular words creates "a substantial risk of suppressing
ideas in the process."7
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Johnson Court proceeded in much the
same deliberate manner. First, Justice Brennan characterized the challenged
conduct as expressive in nature. Next, he surveyed the various first amend-
ment categories and the corresponding tests. Finally, he concluded that the
first amendment protected the defendant's flag burning. This approach, like
Justice Harlan's, reflects a desire to defuse the first amendment issue and
to approach it primarily in traditional constitutional terms. Indeed, John-
son's reasoning tracks Cohen's. This is evidenced by Justice Brennan's
arguments that the offensiveness of flag burning should not serve as grounds
for punishment, that flag burning communicates a message different from
and more powerful than its verbal equivalent, and that "[tio conclude that
the Government may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate
only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no
discernible or defensible boundaries." 88
II. THE SACRED FLAG
A. The Johnson Dissenters' View of the Flag
Cief Justice Rehnquist's dissent reveals what was, for him, truly at stake
in Johnson. His use of patriotic rhetoric and ins lack of legal analysis
suggest that he and the other dissenters believed that there was little need
to respond to the Court's opinion on the first amendment merits. Their
patriotic rhetoric emphasized the unique status of the American flag through-
out American history, its use in wartime and the "almost mystical reverence"
with which it is regarded by Americans. 9
85. Id. at 25.
86. Id. at 26.
87. Id.
88. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546. By way of example, Justice Brennan speculated about
prohibiting the burning of state flags, copies of the Constitution and copies of the presidential
seal. Id.
89. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2552 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, which quotes poetry and the national
anthem, seems intended to generate more of an emotive response than an
intellectual one. Ironically, that was the result when Johnson burned the
American flag in protest. Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted
to characterize the flag as an indispensable participant in American history,
from the nation's birth to the present. Moreover, in doing so in the context
of flag burning, Chief Justice Rehnquist conflated signifier-the flag-and
signified-what the flag represents-and suggested that one who physically
harms an American flag is at the same time harming the nation. 90 Under
this view, the flag not only represents the nation but, in some important
sense, it is the nation.9'
In contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis of the history and role
of the flag itself, he expended minimal effort on several unpersuasive first
amendment arguments, including an unfortunate comparison between flag
burning and fighting words.9 2 The fighting words doctrine, to the extent it
remains valid first amendment law,93 requires a face-to-face confrontation
that clearly was not present in Johnson. He also compared flag burning to
an "inarticulate grunt or roar ' 94 even though neither the civility nor the
clarity of expression constitutes a proper first amendment basis for punish-
ment after Cohen v California.9" Finally, he maintained that Texas was
not punishing the defendant's ideas but only his use of a special symbol,
even though the Texas statute, which was activated by a viewer's offended
reaction, applied to anyone engaged in obviously political protest.
In short, Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis asserted that the American
flag is so singular that it should not be subject to the usual first amendment
principles but should instead constitute a special class of one. Chief Justice
Rehnquist thus argued that the American flag does not belong to the world
of the first amendment at all. 6 Justice Stevens more forthrightly argued
90. I understand this harm to the nation to be different from any "profound offense"
caused to individuals by such conduct. See 2 J. FinERO, THE MORAL LIrrs OF TEm CmiINAL
LAw-OFaNSE TO OTMRS 50 (1985) (contamng a discussion of profound offense from a
liberal perspective).
91. The defendant in Johnson also identified the flag with the nation when he chanted-
while the flag was burning-"Armerca, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you." Johnson,
109 S. Ct. at 2536 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For a discussion of fighting words in first
amendment analysis, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
93. Since Chaplinsky, the Court has not upheld as constitutional a single conviction based
on the presence of fighting words.
94. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (discussed supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text).
96. This position is very different from the usual hierarchical approach to the first
amendment whereby political speech is afforded maximum first amendment protection, com-
mercial and "indecent" speech somewhat less, and obscene speech no first amendment
protection whatsoever. According to the Chief Justice, flag burning is not subject to traditional
first amendment pnnciples at all because, as argued at length m this Article, the American
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this position in his dissenting opimon.97 More important, though, is what
underlies both dissenting opinions: the belief that our secular political
community requires patriotic symbols such as the flag much as religious
communities require religious symbols. The dissenting opimons demand that
the American flag be treated as sacred, a concept to which I now turn.
B. The Concept of the Sacred
The distinction between the sacred and the non-sacred 98 appeared several
millenma ago m Western religion. Although it did not originate with
Judaism,9 the Pentateuch emphasizes the distinction between "Koh'desh"
(the sacred or holy) and "Chol" (the non-sacred or non-holy), for example,
in connection with the Israelites (the "holy people") and the land of Israel
(the "holy land"). 1'0 The concept of the sacred was carried over into
Christianity, but it was not until the twentieth century that it began to be
studied comparatively. 10 1
Rudolf Otto is widely credited with the seminal analysis of the sacred in
which he examined the "characteristics of this frightemng and irrational
experience" of the sacred.1°2 More recently, theologian Mircea Eliade ad-
dressed the question of the sacred, focusing "not [as Otto had] on the
relation between the rational and nonrational elements of religion but the
sacred in its entirety." 13 Eliade articulated a comprehensive theory regarding
religion and, in particular, the ways in which humanity divides time, space
and matter into the two realms of the sacred and the non-sacred, or the
holy and the non-holy.
Eliade began his analysis with a discussion of those ways in which the
sacred manifests itself in human life through what he calls hierophany, that
is, the sacred literally making itself seen.104 According to Eliade, the history
of religion is, in essence, a series of these hierophames. Each of these
flag is sacred.
For criticism of the Court's luerarchical approach as it affects the first amendment protection
of artistic expression, see Nahmod, supra note 77.
97. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. The word "sacred" derives from the Latin "sacer" which means "set off" or
"restricted." THE AmmiucAN HERrTAGE DIcTioNARY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1083 (2d ed.
1982).
99. See generally E. DuRHEim, THE ELEMENTARY Foms OF THE RELiGIOUs Lim (J. Swain
trans. 1954) (the sacred force in society that sets apart or forbids certain things is society
itself).
i00. E.g., Leviticus 19:1-2 ("And the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying. Speak unto all the
congregation of the children of Israel, and say unto them, Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord
your God am holy.").
101. See generally R. OTTo, THE IDEA OF Tm SACRED (Eng. trans. 1928).
102. M. ELIADE, THE SACRED AND Tim PROFANE 9 (1957).
103. Id. at 10 (emphasis in onginal).
104. Id. at 11.
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hierophames represents the same phenomenon: a manifestation of a wholly
different reality Further, the worship of seemingly ordinary places and
things, such as rocks or sacred groves, is in fact a recognition of the
hierophany rather than a veneration of the object itself. This is true because
the object, while remaining itself, has become transformed, through the
hierophany, into another supernatural reality As in the Catholic mystery
of transubstantiation, the object retains all the substance and accidents of
its original nature while also assuming the substance of the sacred object. °s
1. Sacred Space
For Eliade, the primal religious experience is the recognition that space
is not homogeneous; it is divided into the sacred and the profane, with
only the sacred space having structure or significance. "The manifestation
of the sacred ontologically founds the world."106 For Eliade, the recognition
of the sacred establishes the foundation or focal point of the world, around
which all non-sacred reality revolves. 107
Eliade argued that consecration of space-the home, for example-is most
commonly accomplished through the re-enactment or retelling of the creation
narrative. 08 He noted that the making of a home is the "creation of the
world that one has chosen to inhabit.'"' 9 According to Eliade, there are
two ways of doing this: either by orienting the dwelling to the divine (by
orienting it to the holy directions or by syrnbolicly installing the axis mundi)
or by repeating through ritual re-enactment the creation of the world. This
consecration of the dwelling was transferred to the consecration of more
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id. at 21.
107. Eliade cited a number of examples of this process as it regards space, from the ordinary
modem expenence of crossing the threshold of a church to the treatment of the threshold of
human habitation, where many rituals have long been practiced. He also cites a number of
historical and scriptural references to places regarded as holy after some manifestation of the
divine in that place, for example, Beth-el, so called by -Jacob after the God of Abraham
appeared to him there in Genesis 28:12-19. M. ELLADE, supra note 102, at 26. He also noted
that new territory is frequently adopted by the manifestation of the holy in that space as, for
example, the setting up of an altar in the Vedic religion. Id. at 30. The similarity to the
placing of an American flag on the moon in 1969 by the first person there is striking.
108. For example, for the Achilpa tribe of Australia, the central creation narrative involves
the divine being setting up the sacred pole (kauwa-auwa), anointing it with blood and then
ascending on it into the sky. This sacred pole becomes the cosmic axis and is central to the
life of the Achilpa, so much so that the destruction of the pole can lead to complete social
disintegration of the tribe. Id. at 33. A similar pattern is repeated in religions in which a
particular space becomes the center of the world through a re-enactment of the cosmological
narrative, a paradigm seen in numerous religions. Among the examples Eliade provided are
Babyloman religion, the Chinese capital, and the rock upon which the Jerusalem temple was
built. In each of these cases, the world of the people is centered around the holy place, and
reality moves outward from there. Id. at 36-42.
109. Id. at 51 (emphasis in original).
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formal holy places, when buildings such as churches and temples began to
be built specifically for holy purposes." 0
2. Sacred Time
According to Eliade, time, like space, is similarly divided into the sacred
and the profane. Sacred time does not pass and is of infinite duration. The
sacred time of a religious festival, for example, brings to the present the
"primordial mythical time.""' For Christians the Eucharist Mass is the re-
enactment or memorializing of the crucifixion. It also constitutes partici-
pation in the perpetual Last Supper of which it is an earthly re-creation." 2
Time also is sacralized through history. As Eliade observed, this may be
seen in many religions, as in the Greek myths."' But it is most clearly seen
in the Judeo-Christian tradition, with its repeated appearances of the divine
in the history of the people. Historical time is thus transformed into sacred
time.
3. Sacred Things
Eliade next considered the sacralization of nature and natural objects,
notably water. Eliade found that it is from water, which is invariably viewed
as pre-existent, that creation comes. Thus, water always represents creation
or the possibility of re-creation. 14
From the symbolism of water, Eliade explored the ways in which cultures
adopt other symbols. In particular, he examined the symbols adopted by
Christianity '" He also considered the sacralization of life as a whole,
whereby the human body is made sacred through ritual and becomes a
realization of the cosmos." 6 At the same time, he described the many
symbols present in this sacralization, from domestic objects to funerary
objects, each of which is made holy in itself. Eliade further assessed rites
of passage, initiation and rebirth, and examined how these convert the
human body and related objects into religious symbols.
110. Id. at 52-65.
111. Id. at 68 (emphasis in original).
112. Eliade noted that for many primitive cultures the world equals time. Their languages
use the same words to refer to the passage of a year as they do to refer to the world. Thus,
each new year is a new creation. Id. at 73. Consequently, many religions ritually relate the
new year to a new creation. Id. at 77-78.
113. Id. at 68-I13.
114. Examples include the flood in Genesis and the Christian rite of baptism in which a
human being dies and is reborn. Id. at 133-36 (baptism).
115. EIiade's examination went beyond Christianity. For example, he noted that many
religions once required that birth take place on the ground in order to symbolize the relationship
with Mother Earth. Id. at 141-44. Similarly, the sacralization of the sex act may be seen as a
re-enactment of the primordial act of creation. Id. at 144-47.
116. Id. at 175-79.
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Eliade concluded his study with an examination of the presence of the
sacred in modern life. He maintained that even modern, non-religious man
is still surrounded by the sacred and by ritual, as reflected in political
parties, the occult and philosophical movements such as those for sexual
freedom. 1 7 Eliade insisted: "[T]he majority of men 'without religion' still
hold to pseudo religions and degenerated mythologies. There is nothing
surprising in this, for . profane man is the descendant of homo religiosus
and he cannot wipe out his own history "11
C. The Flag as Sacred Symbol
Eliade's comprehensive theory of religion and the sacred is useful in
understanding the Johnson dissent. Within the framework of Eliade's theory,
the sacralization of time, place and matter re-creates the experience of the
gods when they created the world and participated in its history Analo-
gously, applying that theory to Johnson suggests that for the Johnson
dissenters the flag is a sacred object which must be "venerated" (a specif-
ically religious term" 9 appearing in the Texas statute) because it has played
a critical role in American history and because it embodies the American
historical experience. Flying the flag and engaging in other related rituals
represent the re-enactment of the creation of the republic and other impor-
tant moments in its history, a re-creation that Eliade suggests sacralizes
time. Special ceremonies such as the Pledge of Allegiance do so as well. 2
Furthermore, space is sacralized when the flag is flown over government
buildings and at the sites of famous battles, or when it is placed on the
moon by an astronaut. To employ Eliade's terminology, the flag is a
hierophany, the sacred making itself seen.' 2'
Through this discussion of the sacred, the style and substance of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opimon become considerably more under-
standable. While the flag symbolizes national unity to him, it also represents
America's imagined past and present. It is no accident that Chief Justice
Rehnquist made poetry and song-quintessential vessels for cultural myths-
a crucial part of his story of the flag's participation in the birth and life
of America. Patriotic poetry and song promote the notions that the flag is
a vital component of the American experience and that it therefore deserves
veneration. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, such veneration draws citizens
117 Id. at 206-07
118. Id. at 209.
119. The word "venerate," meaning "to regard with respect, reverence or deference," comes
from the Latin venerari, from venus, love. THE AmERicAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1341 (2d ed. 1982).
120. Note that the Pledge of Allegiance refers explicitly to allegiance to the flag, not only
to "the Republic for which it stands."
121. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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within the American experience, invites vicarious participation in the birth
of the republic and the various wars in which American blood was spilled
in defense of that republic, and thus promotes their attachment to it.
An early example of such veneration of the flag is the statutory prohibition
against commercial use of the flag upheld in Halter v. Nebraska.'2 In
Halter, the Court emphasized the uniqueness of the flag as a symbol:
[We are of opimon that those who enacted the statute knew, what is
known to all, that to every true American the flag is the symbol of the
Nation's power, the emblem of freedom in its truest, best sense. It is
not extravagant to say that to all lovers of the country it signifies
government resting on the consent of the governed; liberty regulated by
law; the protection of the weak against the strong; security against the
exercise of arbitrary power; and absolute safety for free institutions
against foreign aggression.in
The Halter Court's language intimates that permitting commercial use of
the flag brings it into the commercial marketplace, the world of the profane,
and thereby desecrates it. Similarly, the dissenters in Johnson believe that
the flag does not belong in the first amendment marketplace of ideas unless
it retains its sacred character.'24
When the dissenters in Johnson sacralize the flag and remove it from the
world of the first amendment, they demonstrate the force of socially
generated patriotic meanings of signifiers. Moreover, as I have argued, their
move embodies a religious impulse. If my assessment is correct, it may be
helpful to evaluate Johnson not only as a free speech case, but also from
an establishment of religion perspective and, alternatively, from an American
civil religion perspective. 2- Evaluating Johnson from a civil religion per-
spective reveals what the Court's decision may have cost the American
political community. 2 6
122. 205 U.S. 34 (1907). The Court in Johnson distinguished Halter on two grounds: the
first amendment had not yet been held applicable to the states and Halter involved commercial
speech. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2545 n.10.
123. Halter, 205 U.S. at 43.
124. Chief Justice Rehnquist made this point explicit when he asserted: "[The flag] does
not represent the views of any particular political party, and it does not represent any particular
political philosophy. The flag is not simply another 'idea' or 'point of view' competing for
recognition in the marketplace of ideas." Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552. The position that the
American flag does not belong in either the marketplace of goods or that of ideas might be
grounded on the views that marketplaces create changing values for their commodities while
the value of the American flag should not vary.
125. For a definition and discussion of civil religion, see infra text accompanying notes 148-
52.
126. Despite this cost, I later contend that even apart from the traditional first amendment
pnnciples it applied, Johnson was, on balance, a wise decision because of the crucial lessons
it attempted to teach the American political community. See infra text accompanying notes
184-86.
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III. ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION 127
Evaluating Johnson as an establishment of religion case suggests several
interesting questions. First, what would the result have been in Johnson if
establishment of religion standards, and not free speech standards, were
used? Second, had the Johnson dissenters persuaded the majority, would
the ruling have been consistent with the Court's decision in Lynch v
Donnelly,12 the creche case?
A. Establishment of Religion Applied to Johnson
I have argued that a sacralizing impulse was at work in the Johnson
dissent. Nevertheless, if the defendant in Johnson had challenged the Texas
statute on establishment of religion grounds rather than on free speech
grounds, punishing him for flag burning in violation of the Texas statute
would not constitute an establishment of religion.
There are several reasons for this result. Although the Johnson dissenters
sacralized the flag, they did not transform it into a symbol identified with
any particular religion, 129 a move which would have run afoul of the
establishment clause. 30 Rather, they treated it as a unique political and
patriotic symbol. In this regard, government can speak in its own right in
an attempt to convey political and patriotic messages, despite a claim based
on the establishment clause, provided it does not coerce citizens into
communicating those messages themselves. 3'
Two examples of this principle come readily to mind. First, in West
Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, 37 the Court held that a compulsory
flag salute in public schools violated the first amendment. However, the
Court made clear that states confront no first amendment hurdles in
establishing a non-compulsory flag salute for the purposes of promoting
127. The first amendment reads in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
128. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
129. In contrast, a statute prohibiting the burning of a cross or of a menorah would likely
constitute an establishment of religion.
130. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 830 (1989), which held,
pursuant to the free exercise clause of the first amendment, that unemployment compensation
benefits could not be denied to a person who refused to work on Sundays because he believed
that "as a Chnstian, he could not work on the 'Lord's Day."' The Court determined that it
was irrelevant that this person was not a member of an established church or sect because his
sincerity was not in doubt.
131. While I speak here of establishment of religion, the same holds true for free speech:
government can engage in noncoercive and nonpartisan patriotic speech without violating the
prohibition against infringing the freedom of speech. Indeed, the accompanying cases discussed
in the text support this conclusion. See Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. RE,. 565
(1980). See generally M. YuDoF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983).
132. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
[Vol. 66:511
THE SACRED FLAG
national unity and patriotism. Similarly, in Wooley v. Maynard, 133 the Court
ruled that a state constitutionally could not punish persons who covered
the motto "Live Free or Die" on passenger vehicle license plates if they
disagreed with it on moral and religious grounds. Reasoning from Barnette,
the Court identified the compulsory nature of the motto protected by statute
as the objectionable feature. But the Court nowhere suggested-just as it
did not in Barnette-that the state could not "communicate to others an
official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individ-
ualism."' 34
Consequently, applying an establishment of religion analysis-one based
upon the position that government is attempting to sacralize the flag-
would have led to a different result m Johnson itself. Although this approach
provides some analytical insight into Johnson, it was the free speech position
argued by the defendant that ultimately was accepted by the Johnson Court.
B. Consistency with Lynch
It is intriguing that the demand that the flag be sacralized in Johnson
came from the very same Justices (with the exception of Justice Stevens)
who had previously comprised (along with then Chief Justice Burger) the
majority in Lynch in ruling that government can display the creche in certain
circumstances without violating the establishment of religion clause of the
first amendment. In Lynch the Court determined that'in the context of the
challenged display the creche was secular rather than sacred for establishment
of religion purposes.' 35 The Court thus appeared to desacralize the creche
in order to permit government to display it. In contrast, the Johnson
dissenters sacralized the flag. It would seem, then, that the dissent in
Johnson and the position of these same Justices in Lynch are inconsistent.
But this inconsistency is more facial than actual. After all, Lynch did
permit the creche to be displayed even though the cost was nominal for the
sacred. The subtext of Lynch is that the creche is indeed a religious symbol;
secularizing it in Lynch was constitutionally necessary in order to allow its
display. The creche remained a sacred symbol even though the Court, with
a wink and a nod, determined as an establishment of religion matter that
its purpose and primary effect were not religious. Therefore, under the
reasoning in Lynch, government can, without violating the establishment
clause, appropriate a particular sacred symbol for political purposes. 3 6
133. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
134. Id. at 717.
135. Thus, the Court did to the creche what the songwriter Irving Berlin did to Christmas
and Easter when he wrote "White Christmas" and "Easter Parade," two famous songs with
no religious content whatsoever that secularized those holidays for many Americans.
136. See Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A
Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DurE L.J. 770, 786 (criticizing Lynch as an example
of "the appropriation of a particular religion or faith as a practice of government").
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Similarly, under the reasoning of the Johnson dissent, government can,
without violating freedom of speech, appropriate a particular patriotic
symbol and convert it into a sacred one for political purposes.
The positions of the Justices in Lynch and the Johnson dissenters are
not inconsistent for another reason. They adopt a similar first amendment
methodology to the issues confronting them. In both cases Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor argued that there are, or ought
to be, historical exceptions to the usual first amendment rules, whether they
be establishment of religion rules or free speech rules. Thus, while the
traditional three-part establishment of religion test was applied in Lynch,
the Court's opinion emphasized "a significant historical religious event long
celebrated in the Western World."' 37 This historical emphasis allowed the
Court to conclude that the celebration of Christmas and the depiction of
its origins through the creche were "legitimate secular purposes,"'3 and
that "display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorsement of
religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of
the Holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass,' or the exhibition of literally hundreds
of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums."' 39
The Court's historically grounded reasoning in Lynch is best captured by
the following:
It would be iromc, however, if the inclusion of a single symbol of a
particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration acknowledged
in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people,
by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries,
would so "taint" the city's exhibit as to render it violative of the
Establishment Clause.140
The Court even more explicitly relied on "unique history" in Marsh v
Chambers14 when it upheld the opening of legislative sessions with prayers
led by a state-employed chaplain against, an establishment of religion chal-
lenge. After noting that the first Congress hired a chaplain in 1789, shortly
before it agreed on the language of the first amendment, the Marsh Court
explained:
[H]istorical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended
the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that
Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress-their
actions reveal their intent.
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative
137. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
138. Id. at 685.
139. Id. at 683.
140. Id. at 686.
141. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric'of our society.
[I]t is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among
the people of this country.'4 2
The Court's historical methodology in Lynch and Marsh is strikingly
similar to that of the Johnson dissenters insofar as the dissenters emphasize
the umque lustorical role of the American flag. In all three cases, history
is used to explain why the usual first amendment rules do not apply to
invalidate the challenged government conduct. However, there is at least
one significant difference in these historical methodologies that should be
noted. History was employed in Lynch and Marsh as part of a conventional
onginalist argument to the effect that the Framers either would have
approved, or did in fact approve, the publicly supported display of a creche
and the hiring of a chaplain. In this sense, Lynch and Marsh were not
exceptions to the first amendment at all.
In contrast, the Johnson dissenters did not make a conventional originalist
argument. Instead, they contended that the "umque history" of the Amer-
ican flag warranted the creation of a special exception to the usual first
amendment rules. 4 1 Under this approach, the flag would avoid the first
amendment entirely, thereby going considerably beyond the rationales of
Lynch and Marsh. The dissenters thus demonstrated that they were intent
on sacralizing the flag. In so doing, the dissenters would permit government
not to establish religion as such but rather to promote American civil
religion.
IV. AMBRICAN CIVIL RELIGION, MYTHS AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY
In Johnson; the dissenters viewed the flag as a sacred object whose
veneration re-creates American history in the same way that the veneration
of an Eastern Orthodox icon re-creates the religious experience that it
represents. 144 As mentioned earlier, 4 veneration of the flag as an American
patriotic symbol invites citizens to participate vicariously in important
142. Id. at 790, 792.
143. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548.
144. Weitzmann bnefly describes the history of religious icons as follows:
The word "icon" in the broadest sense means simply "image," any image, but
in the more restncted sense in wluch it is generally understood, it means a holy
image to which special veneration is given. The icon plays a very specific role in
the Orthodox Church, where its worship in the course of time became integrated
into the celebration of the liturgy. [Oin the whole, holy images in the Latin
West did not attain the same exalted position which they occupied in the life of
the Orthodox believer. According to the Greek Church Fathers the icon was
considered equal in importance to the written word, the appeal to the eyes being
just as authoritative as that to the ears.
K. WmErzMANN, THE ICON: HOLY IMAGEs-SXTH TO FOURT BNTH CENTURY 7 (1978).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 119-26.
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historical events, including the birth of the republic and the various wars
in which the republic and its interests were defended. The feelings engendered
by such vicarious participation have several characteristics. First, these
feelings of involvement and re-creation of history do not depend on whether
the history to which they pertain is actual or mythic.'" Second, these
feelings provide the individual with a sense of connection and attachment
to a political community, a sense of belonging to a discrete group with
shared political beliefs and values. This sense serves to bind the individual
to a community that is transcendent and that is more important than any
individual. I argue next, after first considering American civil religion and
myths, that sacred patriotic symbols such as the flag are necessary for the
maintenance and promotion of this transcendent sense of connection and
attachment to the American political community "47
A. American Civil Religion
The term "civil religion" originated in Rousseau's The Social Contract.'4
However, it was reintroduced into modern thought by Robert Bellah in
1967, in an influential essay, "Civil Religion in America. ' 1 41 According to
Bellah, civil religion is a set of beliefs and attitudes that explain the meaning
and purpose of a political society in terms of a transcendent spiritual reality
These beliefs and attitudes are held by people generally and expressed in
public rituals, myths and symbols. Bellah maintained that the major civil
religion events in American history are the Revolution, the Civil War, the
deaths of Lincoln and Kennedy and the world wars. 50 For Bellah, these
civil religion events have Biblical analogues or archetypes which include the
Exodus, the Chosen People, the Promised Land and Sacrificial Death and
Rebirth.'
Since Bellah, others have discerned five substantive themes in civil religion:
(1) the political community should be guided by a transcendent principle of
morality; (2) a faith in democracy as a way of life for all; (3) civic piety,
or the belief that the exercise of the responsibilities of citizenship is good
in and of itself; (4) a reverence for American religious folkways and (5) a
146. For example, see the description of the "first skirmishes of the Revolutionary War"
contained in Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Concord Hymn" and the story in John Greenleaf
Whittier's poem, "Barbara Frietchie," both noted in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2549-50 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
147 If this is so, then the claim that Johnson unduly promoted individual liberty at the
expense of political community must be addressed. For a discussion of this point, see infra
text accompanying notes 172-93.
148. J. RoussEAu, THm SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. 4, ch. 8 (H. Tozer trans. 3d ed. 1948).
149. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (Winter 1967). See generally AMEmCAm
Civia RELiGIoN (D. Jones & R. Richey eds. 1974) (containing collection of essays discussing
and interpreting the phrase "civil religion").
150. Bellah, supra note 149, at 16-18.
151. Id. at 18. According to Mark Tushnet, Bellah's definition of civil religion as "a true
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belief that destiny has great things in store for the American people.152
However American civil religion is defined, the American flag is surely
one of its most powerful and dramatic national symbols. Not only is the
flag employed in patriotic rituals, but for many it represents national unity,
American political ideals and important historical events, mythical or oth-
erwise. The flag thereby promotes American civil religion.
B. Myths
Nietzsche originated the provocative idea that the world is aesthetically
self-creating. 5 1 Challenging the philosophical search for origins and being,
Nietzsche insisted that all knowledge-metaphysics, science, religion, mo-
rality and art-is a manifestation of the will to live and the will to power. 54
For Nietzsche there are no absolutes; we can accord only aesthetic status
to human knowledge because human knowledge arises from an aesthetically
creative human impulse. More important for present purposes, Nietzsche
maintained that even though this aesthetic approach does not provide access
to reality, it does allow us to live through the creation of myths which
provide a haven from the understanding that there are no absolutes. 55
According to Nietzsche, myths are a central and indispensable element of
culture:
Without myth every culture loses the healthy power of its creativity:
only a horizon defined by myths'completes and unifies a whole cultural
movement. Myth alone saves all the powers of the imagination and of
Apollonian dream from their aimless wanderings. . Even the state
knows no more powerful unwritten laws than the mythical foundation
that guarantees its connection with religion and its growth from mythical
notions. 16
Nietzsche contended that Western culture has become too critical, skeptical
and rational for its own good. In his view, creative culture requires that
we live by a "common native myth, which would give to our culture a firm
religion, not 'religion in general' or diffuse religiosity" and "its use in the U.S. context are
quite controversial and probably lack substantial scholarly support." M. TusmHmr, RED,
Wm, AND BLUE: A CRTcAL ANAiysis OF CONsTrrrtToNAL LAw 268 n.86-(1988). In Tushnet's
view, civil religion "includes among its elements a diffuse religiosity, captured in the law by
Justice Douglas' statement 'We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being."' Id. at 268 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
152. See Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1253
(1986).
153. See A. ME nL, PRoPRa-rs OF ExTREMrrY: NiXmzscHE, HEIDEGOER, FOUCAULT, DERRIDA
29-33 (1985).
154. F NiETzscHE, TBE WILL TO POWER § 853 (W Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans.,
W Kaufmann ed. 1967).
155. See generally A. MEou.m, supra note 153, at 65-102 (chapter discussing Nietzsche and
myth).
156. Id. at 75 (quoting F NmTzscm, Tan BniiR OF TRAGEDY).
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foundation and protect it from the dissolving effects of the histoncal
process. 1157 When myths outlive their usefulness, Nietzsche argued, they
should be discarded and new ones developed.1 5 1
Eliade and Nietzsche might disagree about the social utility of religion
and its particular myths. Nevertheless, Eliade made a point about the
pervasive importance of myths, similar to that made by Nietzsche, when he
asserted:
[Modern] nonreligious man descends from homo religiosus and, whether
he likes it or not, he is also the work of religious man . The
majority of the "irreligious" still behave religiously, even though they
are not aware of the fact. We refer not only to the modern man's many
"superstitions" and "tabus," all of them magico-religious in structure.
But the modern man who feels and claims that he is nonreligious still
retains a large stock of camouflaged myths and degenerated rituals.
A whole volume could well be written on the myths of modem man,
on the mythologies camouflaged in the plays that he enjoys, in the
books that he reads.
159
According to Nietzsche, Eliade and other thinkers, t6° then, myths are
necessary for individuals and the societies in which they live. They supply
meaning for individuals and their societies as well as provide an emotional
connection for individuals as members of a political community. Indeed,
Plato, whose The Republic has been described as "the true source of the
entire tradition of political mysticism,"' 16 long ago recognized the function
of myth. Plato argued that only those myths which serve the purposes of
the political community should be permitted in the republic by the philos-
opher-kings. 62 The flag as signifier represents what might be termed the
myths of nationhood and national unity, myths which, according to the
Johnson dissenters, render sacred the American flag.
157. A. MEGILL, supra note 153 at 75.
158. See id. at 82-84.
159. M. ELIADE, supra note 102, at 203-05.
160. Max Lemer made a similar point in 1937:
[A]I1 peoples have one time had this sense of umqueness and mission, although
in the older cultures it tends to wear off and a revolution of some sort or other
is needed to renew it. Robert Michels [in his Der Patrotismus (1929)] has spoken
of the two basic myths of patriotism-the myth of umque national ongin and
the myth of unique national destiny. In Amenca the two converged in the myth
of a democratic revolution and a revolutionary democracy. Amencans took great
pride in their revolution, although it must be noted that the pnde increased in
retrospect as the revolution receded, the revolutionary energy ebbed and the
democratic 61an grew too dangerous for the men of substance.
Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YAIE L.J. 1290, 1295 (1937) (citations omitted)
(footnote omitted).
161. R. NISBET, TEE SocIAL PmtosopHERs: CoMMUNITY & CoNFLICT IN WESTERN THOUGHT
7 (rev. ed. 1982).
162. See generally PLATO, THE REPuBLIc bk. III (F Comford trans. 1941) (dialogue
prescribing suitable subjects and forms of literature for virtuous society).
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C. Attachment to the American Political Community
Plato's The Republic "has had the effect of making the ideal of politics,
of political power, of the political bond, of the political community, the
most distinctive and most influential of all types of community to be found
in Western philosophy." 163 According to Plato, feeling a part of a political
community was a prerequisite for The Republic's all-encompassing political
state.'6 I maintain that it is also indispensable for the effective functiomng
of the American republic. 16 True, there has been extensive discussion and
debate among historians and constitutional scholars regarding the relevance
for American political history and current constitutional doctrine of the
163. R. NIsBET, supra note 161, at 3. Nisbet continues:
Whatever the signal differences between the two types of modem state [i.e., the
democratic and the totalitarian], what they have in common is the ascendancy
of the political bond over all others in society; of the political role over all roles
of kinship, religion, occupation, and place; of the political intellectual over all
other intellectuals; of political authority over all competing social and cultural
authorities; and, finally, the proffer of the political state as the cief protection
of man from the uncertainties, deprivations, and miseries of this world.
Id.
164. See generally PLATO, supra note 162, at bk. II (origins and composition of a city-
state).
165. Political community is also related to economic community, a subject beyond the scope
of this Article. Regarding economic community and the commerce clause, Justice Jackson
stated in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Dumond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949):
The Commerce Clause is one of the most prolific sources of national power and
an equally prolific source of conflict with legislation of the state.
[The] pnnciple that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the
gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy, including the vital power
of erecting customs barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that
the states are not separable economic units.
Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this
Court which has given it reality.
Id. at 534, 537-39.
Laurence Tribe, in his analysis of the Court's opinion in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), argued that there is an important theoretical connection
between the commerce clause and political community: "Behind the Court's analysis in Exxon
stands an important doctrinal theme: the negative implications of the commerce clause derive,
principally from a political theory of umon, not from an economic theory of free trade. The
function of the clause is to ensure national solidarity, not economic efficiency." L. TRIE,
AmmucA CoNsTrr~rroiA LAW 417 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis in original).
The interstate privileges and immunities clause similarly promotes both economic and political
community. As the Court asserted m Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (footnotes
omitted):
The primary purpose of this clause was to help fuse into one Nation a
collection of independent, sovereign States. It was designed to insure to a citizen
of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of
State B enjoy. For protection of such equality the citizen of State A was not to
be restricted to the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic processes and
1991]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
ideals of classical republicanism, variously described as: direct political
participation in self-government, distrust of centralized authority, and the
subordination of private interests to those of the political community-civic
virtue. 66 Whether the contours of these ideals are articulable does not
matter; the fact remains that a democratic society-one in which persons
participate in self-governance-requires some modicum of a shared com-
munity of understanding so that its members feel an attachment and
allegiance to it.
Amy Gutmann's theory of democratic education supports this conten-
tion. 67 For Gutmann, democracy requires a shared community of under-
standing for which there are two conditions: a critical deliberative faculty-
the ability to deliberate about moral questions, or moral reasoning-and an
understanding of, and predisposition toward, life in democratic society-a
willingness to deliberate about moral questions, or moral character Focusing
on ways to engender these conditions, and thus, on the proper nature of
education in the United States, she explained: "[A] democratic state of
education tries to teach virtue-not the virtue of the family state (power
based upon knowledge), but what might best be called democratic virtue:
the ability to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social repro-
duction." 1 61
Gutmann's discussion of a shared community of understanding, coupled
with her definition of moral character as a willingness to deliberate about
moral questions, correctly assumes that a democratic political community
requires of its members an emotional as well as a deliberative, rational and
intellectual attachment to that community Consequently, as indicated by
the earlier discussion of the flag's role in American civil religion and its
myths, an emotional attachment to the American flag as a sacred symbol
of nationhood and national unity constitutes an important aspect of emo-
tional attachment and allegiance to the political community as well. As
Eliade observed: "A religious symbol conveys its message even if it is no
longer consciously understood in every part. For a symbol speaks to the
whole human being and not only to the intelligence."'' 69 Because the Court's
decision in Johnson removed the question of flag burning from the legislative
official retaliation.
Id. at 395. See also Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985), which,
in holding violative of the interstate privileges and immunities clause a state rule limiting bar
admission to local residents, stated that the clause "was intended to create a national economic
union." Id. at 279-80.
166. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1976);
0. WOOD, Tim CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv L. Rxv 4
(1985); Sherry, The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A Lawyer's Guide to Contemporary
Historical Scholarship, 5 CONST. Comm. 323 (1988); Sunstem, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv 29 (1985).
167. A. GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987).
168. Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).
169. M. ELIADE, supra note 102, at 129 (emphasis in original).
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process and thus refused to treat the flag as sacred, Johnson could erode
attachment and allegiance to the American political community. 70
V. TOWARD A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF TEXAS V. JOHNSON
From the perspective of political community and the sacred, Johnson is
considerably more problematic than it appeared when looked at solely
through Justice Brennan's liberty-promoting first amendment lens. The
special focus of this Article on the sacred is intended to demonstrate that
socially generated meanings of the American flag and other patriotic symbols
are both powerful and necessary for the coherence of the political com-
munity. Nevertheless, in this last Part, I defend Johnson as a wise decision
by suggesting several educational justifications for its refusal to treat the
flag as sacred.171 Even apart from elucidating well established first amend-
ment principles, the Court in Johnson taught the American political com-
munity several vital lessons. The first lesson gleaned from Johnson is that
a genuine respect for patriotic symbols cannot and should not be mandated
by government. Second, the American flag represents, and the first amend-
ment exemplifies, certain political principles grounded on the Enlightenment.
The final and perhaps most important lesson is that no necessary relationship
exists between symbols and truth or reality.
A. Respect for Patriotic Symbols
Patriotic symbols do not promote political community as effectively when
government insists on their sacredness as they do when the community
170. Cf. W BERNs, FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FhsT AMENDMENT (1957). Berns states:
American constitutional law regarding free speech and press has tended to
proceed on the assumptions that free speech and press is a right and that virtue
could be ignored by the Court, that the rightness or wrongness of speech or of
the beliefs it expressed was immaterial to a just solution of controversies.
. The basic point is that the purpose of law is and must be to promote
virtue, not to guarantee rights of any description.
• Men do live together, and living together, to say nothing of living well
together, carries certain responsibilities...
The solution to the problem of freedom cannot be found in a test to
replace the [clear and present] danger test; the solution to the problem of
maintaining free government, government under which men are permitted to
speak freely, lies in citizenship education, moral education.
Id. at 247-53 (emphasis in original).
171. These justifications, which are a mixture of classical liberal and communitanan elements,
are not put forward as definitive but rather as invitations for future discussion and debate on
this difficult subject. I should note that my position-that Johnson's classical liberal approach
to flag burning and the first amendment is not fundamentally at odds with attachment and
allegiance to political community-parallels the more general and.comprehensive argument of
Joel Feinberg who rejects the view that "the personal autonomy so treasured by liberals is
incompatible with certain community values that most of us would be loath to give up." 4 J.
FEINEERG, Tan MORAL Lnus OF nm CRIMiNAL LAw-HARmL WRONGDOING 81 (1988).
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voluntarily assumes the symbol's sacred nature. True intellectual and emo-
tional attachment to patriotic symbols, and allegiance to a political com-
munity, arise out of free choice, not coercion. 172 Government, of course,
plays a significant role in promoting patriotic symbols. By indicating that
the majority of the political community believes that certain patriotic
symbols are indeed deserving of respect, such governmental promotion has
the full intellectual and emotional force of that community behind it.
Obviously, this cannot help but influence individuals to share that sentiment;
indeed, that is a primary purpose of this kind of government speech.
Nevertheless, individuals should retain the choice whether to honor patriotic
symbols like the flag because, when they do, their commitment is deeper
than it would be otherwise. Such voluntansm is very different from what
the Johnson dissenters sought: to force individuals to treat such patriotic
symbols as sacred by criminalizing their "desecration."'7
Emphasizing voluntarism for patriotic symbols is supported by an inter-
pretation of the free exercise and establishment of religion clauses which
focuses on religious voluntansm. 174 This interpretation is based in part on
the position of James Madison who, in addressing the manner in which
true religious belief can be engendered, asserted 'that Religion or the duty
which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence. ' ""75 It is
also grounded on the assumption that the institutional independence of
religious bodies from government strengthens these institutions by encour-
aging the purity and vitality of their beliefs partly through the free com-
petition of those beliefs on their merits. 76 Similarly, government acts unwisely
when it attempts to coerce individual respect for patriotic symbols.
172. In using the word "coercion" I do not mean to suggest that in Johnson Texas was
unconcerned with preventing offense to those who already possessed patriotic feelings. After
all, the very statute, the application of which was found unconstitutional, defined "desecrate"
in terms of offense to others. See supra note 30. Nevertheless, to the extent that Texas required
all persons to treat the flag with veneration, it clearly attempted to affect the conduct and the
beliefs of persons who did not possess patnotic feelings (including Johnson himself). I
acknowledge, though, that the Texas statute at issue in Johnson is less coercive than a statute
requiring all persons to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag. Cf. West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding violative of the first amendment a requirement
that public school students salute and pledge allegiance to the flag).
173. This argument assumes that "we can guardedly say that a self-conscious and critically
reflective civil religion can play a positive role in cementing the communal symbolic life of
American society," Mirsky, supra note 152, at 1255, so long as we do not ignore or forget
the dangers of civil religion.
174. See, e.g., L. TRIE, supra note 165, at 1160-66.
175. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting J.
MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in 2 THE
WErInGs oF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901)).
176. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II.
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HAtv L. REv 513 (1968). The author maintains:
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B. Political Disagreement, Modernism and Reason
The defendant's conduct in Johnson made an inportant educational
contribution. Recall that the Court read Johnson's flag burning as an
expression of doubt whether "nationhood and national unity are the flag's
referents or that national unity actually exists. 1' 77 This conduct effectively
communicated the message that at least some individuals believe passionately
that there are faults in American society and that the flag's conventionally
accepted message of patriotism and unity does not necessarily reflect una-
nimity or satisfaction in the political community. His conduct was thus that
of a self-declared political outsider 78 and "symbol-breaker." 1 79
The Court's interpretation of Johnson's conduct is distinctly modernist
in nature: it did not seriously question the fundamental political and moral
principles underlying the American system of government, principles grounded
in the Enlightenment. 80 Rather, it challenged the United States to live up
to those principles.
[B]oth religion and society will be strengthened if spiritual and ideological claims
seek recognition on the basis of their intrinsic merit. Institutional independence
of churches is thought to guarantee the purity of vigor of their role in society,
and the free competition of faiths and ideas is expected to guarantee their
excellence and vitality to the benefit of the entire society.
Id. at 517 (citations omitted).
177. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1989).
178. See Sanford Levinson's insightful discussion on constitutional attachment-one's com-
mitment to the Constitution-and the relevance of "good works or inner faith as indicia of
attachment." S. LEvINSON, CoNsl rrrioNAL FA ir 127 (1988); see also id. at 122-54.
179. Max Lerner envisioned an even broader education function of such "symbol-breaking"
when, in writing about the Constitution and the Supreme Court as symbols after the Court
had held invalid much New Deal legislation enacted to remedy the depression, he concluded:
With the lower-income groups [t]heir role-the role of the common man in
every culture-has always been at once symbol-breaking and symbol-making. For
the common man in the past the Constitution has been a symbol of hope and
authority, and the judicial symbol one of protection. He has become the carrier
of those symbols; to appease him and lash down his allegiance to the existing
order have been their functions.
[T]he common man is again assuming his historic function of symbol-
breaker and symbol-maker. Trade-umon action, mass political action based upon
common mass interests are capable of building new myths and are on the
way to doing so. If these [majority] groups succeed in their efforts to make
out of the Constitution once more an "instrument" for the common interest,
the Constitutional symbol will get renewed strength; but the path toward such a
reshaping of the Constitutional symbol lies necessarily through the decline and
fall of the symbol of the divine right of judges.
Lerner, supra note 160, at 1318-19.
180. "[The project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers of the
Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and
law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic. [The ultimate goal was] the
rational organization of everyday social life." Habermas, Modernity-An Incomplete Project,
in THE ANTI-AsT-mnc: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN CuLTuRE (H. Foster ed. 1983).
For a possible postmodern interpretation of the defendant's conduct, see infra note 183.
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Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Johnson may reflect such a
modernist attitude. He explained his joining the Court's decision:
I agree that the flag holds a lonely place of honor in an age when
absolutes are distrusted and simple truths are burdened by unneeded
apologetics.
Though symbols often are what we ourselves make of them, the
flag is constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law and
peace and that freedom which sustains the human spirit.18'
With the dissenters, he shared a sense of what the American flag repre-
sents. Unlike them, however, he thought that denying first amendment
protection to the defendant's conduct in Johnson would be to convert the
American flag into an absolute, or sacred symbol. And as emotionally
appealing as that was for him, it would have been inconsistent with "both
the technical and the fundamental meaning of the Constitution." '1 2 To his
credit, Justice Kennedy resisted the nostalgia for an imagined past in which
the belief in absolutes was taken for granted.83
Furthermore, while Johnson's conduct made an educational contribution,
the Court's Johnson decision itself served an additional educational function.
It declared that the American flag is not sacred in the sense that the
dissenters claimed. Rather, Johnson determined that the flag represents
certain political ideas and a unique government structure. Those who
disagree with those ideas and that structure may communicate their disa-
greement by destroying the American flag, while those who reject such a
position may respond with counterspeech. Even though communication
through emotion is, after Cohen, entitled to considerable first amendment
protection-the Johnson defendant himself communicated emotively-John-
son indicates that the first amendment embodies an Enlightenment prefer-
ence for reason over emotion.1 4 As Justice Brennan explained: "The way
181. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182. Id.
183. In addressing the absence of absolutes, Justice Kennedy also hinted at a more subversive
postmodern interpretation of Johnson's conduct. Regardless of Johnson's intention, his conduct
may be interpreted as expressing the opinion that the values which the American flag is thought
by many to represent are illusory. This interpretation is distinctly postmodern because it
repudiates not only the means for, and'possibility of, bnnging about law, peace and freedom,
but the worthiness of these (and any other) Enlightenment goals. Unlike modernism, post-
modernism therefore rejects the Enlightenment. See J. LyomRD, THE POSTMODERN CONDMrON:
REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 79-82 (G. Benmngton & B. Massumi trans. 1984). For further discussion
of modernism and postmodernism, but in an artistic expression setting, see Nahmod, supra
note 77, at 249-52.
This hint of postmodernity might be what triggered the dissenting Justices' outraged response
to the defendant's conduct. They may have perceived that he was not only criticizing America
for failing to live up to its professed ideals but also was claiming that those ideals are not
worth living up to.
184. That the free speech clause of the first amendment prefers reason to emotion is
consistent with the following observation of Mark Tushnet, made in connection with his
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to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently
about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.""1 5
Consequently, whether one focuses on a first amendment theory of self-
government, or the marketplace of ideas, or-of individuk self-fulfillment,
the Court in Johnson reposed considerable confidence in reason and its
ability to persuade.8 6
C. Symbols, Truth and Reality
Americans live in a society permeated by symbols generated and mamp-
ulated by government, the media and business.1' 7 These symbols often have
the effect of making us feel, think and act in certain ways. As Max Lerner
wrote in 1937"
Men have always used symbols in the struggle for power, but only
latterly have we grown aware generally of their importance. [O]ne
argument that the Supreme Court's establishment of religion and free exercise case law is
confused: "Religion poses a threat to the intellectual world of the liberal tradition because it
is a form of social life that mobilizes the deepest passions of believers in the course of creating
institutions that stand between individuals and the state." M. TUsENET, supra note 151, at
248. From Tushnet's perspective, the argument in this Article, as reformulated, would be that
the passions generated by the flag similarly threaten the intellectual tradition of liberalism. Of
course, Tushnet would not necessarily agree that the preference for reason over emotion, or
the position taken in this Article regarding the sacred, is appropriate, since he went on to
complain:
[Clonstitutionalists in the liberal tradition are committed to developing a law of
religion even though they do not understand why they have to do so. They have
lost that understanding because the liberal tradition has so increased its cultural
authority that it is difficult to retrieve the republican tradition, which does make
sense of the religion clauses
Id. But cf. Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1418, 1425-27 (1989) (review of M.
TusHNr, supra note 151, that in part questions Tushnet's approach to religious liberty).
185. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547. This is followed by Justice Brandeis' famous rationale
of the clear and present danger test in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) ("If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
However, it is important to observe that Justice Brennan did not preclude a response to a
flag burner which
exploitfed] the uniquely persuasive power of the flag itself. We can imagine no
more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one's own, no better
way to counter a flag-burner's message than by saluting the flag that burns, no
surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by
according its remains a respectful burial.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547. The Court's preference for the discourse of reason over that of
emotion, as reflected in Johnson, is thus one of emphasis.
186. 1 want to make clear that my analysis is not intended to marginalize the place of
emotion in first amendment theory. See Nahmod, supra note 77, at 245-47.
187. Few artists have made this point more effectively than Andy Warhol, through his
representation of repeated product images, such as Campbell's Soup cans, as works of art.
These images visually represent the cans of soup themselves and symbolically represent, among
other things, conformity in an assembly-line society.
1991]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
of the essential techniques of power-groups is to manipulate the most
effective symbols in such a way that they become instruments of mass
persuasion. Men are notably more sensitive to images than to
logic, to the concrete symbol than to the abstraction. [T]hese
techniques [of persuasion] depend for their effectiveness upon the sym-
bols that they manipulate, and the symbols depend in turn upon the
entire range of association that they invoke. The power of these symbols
is enormous. Men possess thoughts, but symbols possess men."8
Thus, symbols have political, social and economic implications for Amen-
cans as individuals and as members of a political community
Johnson's flag burning is a good example of the successful generation
and manipulation of such symbols in an attempt to influence beliefs and
behavior. In holding that this conduct was protected under the first amend-
ment and that the flag is not sacred, the Supreme Court in Johnson educated
the American political community about symbols. At a simple level, the
Court made clear that the flag is a piece of cloth which may represent the
United States and its principles but which is not identical with them.8 9 A
contrary conclusion would have amounted to idolatry, with the flag an
object of worship.
Johnson also delivered a subtler and perhaps more crucial educational
message to citizens of a democratic government: symbols do not always tell
the truth and they do not necessarily constitute reality This message dictates
a posture of skepticism toward symbols manufactured and mampulated by
government, the media and business. In a very real sense, such a skeptical
posture can be termed aesthetic, because it is grounded upon a recognition
of the power of all images. Just as images are manufactured and manipulated
by artists for aesthetic purposes, a skeptical aesthetic posture regarding
symbols insists that Americans recognize that symbols can be, and increas-
ingly are, manufactured and manipulated by others for political, social and
economic purposes as well.
The critic Walter Benjamin, in a famous and prescient essay addressing
the impact of this unique twentieth century combination of politics and
reproducible artistic images, observed:
An analysis of art in the age of mechanical reproduction lead[s] us
to an all-important insight: for the first time in world history, mechanical
reproduction emancipates the work of art from its parasitical dependence
on ritual. To an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes
the work of art designed for reproducibility But the instant the
criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic reproduction,
188. Lerner, supra note 160, at 1292-93 (emphasis in onginal) (citations omitted).
189. In semiotic terms, the lesson is that the signifier is not the same as the signified. See
supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
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the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on ritual,
it begins to-be based on another practice-politics. 19
Benjamin maintained that if the media became instruments of political
control, self-government would be threatened. The Court's decision in
Johnson thus. constitutes a powerful warmng to suspect government when
it attempts to create sacred patriotic symbols.191
CONCLUSION
Johnson is an easy case if well-established first amendment principles are
applied to it. Nevertheless, in focusing on the dissenting opimon of Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Johnson, I took seriously his arguments for sacralizing
the American flag when I extensively analyzed the concept of the sacred.
Initially, those arguments led me to compare Johnson and the Court's
establishment of religion doctrine. I then considered the implications of the
flag for American civil religion and political community. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's position also exposed the tension19 between a classical liberal
view of the first amendment which prohibits the creation of sacred patriotic
symbols and supports the individual's right to express her ideas and feelings
without government interference, and a view of government which empha-
sizes political community and, if necessary, restricts the individual's right
to express herself. 93
190. W BENJAmiN, ILLumNArioNs 226 (H. Arendt ed. 1968) (footnote omitted) (essay entitled
The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction). See also id. at 249 n.12, 253 n.21,
where Benjarmn described the use by governments of film and radio for propaganda purposes.
However, he also believed that the mass media could be a liberating force because they
destroyed the primitive aspect of art that identified objects with their reproduced images.
Benjamnn's warning about the power of symbols and their manipulation by government is
remnmscent of, but very different from, Plato's insistence in The Republic that artists must
be controlled by the ruling philosopher-kings so that only approved lies are disseminated for
the good of society. Both Benjamnn and Plato shared the view that symbols, aesthetic and
otherwise, are powerful.
I thank John Stopford, Assistant Professor of the School of the Art Institute of Chicago,
for calling my attention to Walter Benjaun's work.
191. A comparable warmng is embedded in the opimon of Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Stevens m County of Allegheny v. Amencan Civil Liberties Umon, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
The Justices dissented with regard to the majority's finding that the display of a menorah
placed next to a city's Christmas tree, accompaned by a statement referring to the city's
"salute to liberty," was constitutional on the grounds that the city's message was not religious
but patriotic. Id. at 3128. They observed that "the government's use of religion to promote
its own cause is undoubtedly offensive to those whose religious beliefs are not bound up with
their attitude toward the Nation." Id. at 3128.
192. Cf. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Dem-
ocratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HAzv. L. Rav. 603 (1990) (char-
acterzing as a "paradox of public discourse" the suspension by first amendment doctrine of
the norms that make possible the rational deliberation required for self-government and
communication among communities).
193. See W BERis, supra note 170, at 251 (emphasis in original) ("The basic point 'is that
the purpose of law is and must be to promote virtue, not to guarantee rights of any
description.").
1991]
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Nevertheless, while conceding the power of the American flag as a socially
created patriotic symbol, I ultimately rejected Chief Justice Rehnquist's call
to sacralize the flag. Even if patriotic symbols are necessary for political
community, sacralizing the flag is, on balance, unwise. We have come too
far as a nation, with our tradition of tolerance for controversial and
unsettling ideas, and should, by this time, be too mature as a political
community to pumsh political heretics by establishing a blasphemy exception
to the first amendment.
